Wednesday, 30 March 2011- After the Trial Chamber decided to reject the Defence's application on the abuse of process, Mr. Lubanga makes his next move. Now that his first bet has failed, his lawyers will focus on two fundamental arguments: firstly, that their client played no active role in the creation of the UPC military forces and therefore did not take part in a common plan to recruit child soldiers, and secondly, that Thomas Lubanga, "at the time he was responsible for them," did all he could to demobilize the minors. To support these thrusts, the Defence calls the National Deputy Secretary of Customary Affairs of the UPC during the indictment period (2002-2003).
Mr. Balangui Jomba, who testifies publicly, studied Political Sciences in the University of Kisangani, the same institution where Thomas Lubanga got his grade in psychology. "I remember clearly when I met him for the first time in 1984," says the witness. "But I had heard about him time before when I was in my secondary school. At that point in time, Thomas Lubanga was the President of the Association of Students in Kisangani and there was a letter from him circulating in schools which called for a massive enrollment in the university". It was that university which produced some of the initiators of the political movement that later on would be presided over Thomas Lubanga: the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). According to the witness, in 2000, Madam Losuwa, Mr. Uaomwarom, Mr. Adrkio Jhonson, Mr. Mbomosaga and Madam Kabengele, many of them with previous political experience, established the party which aimed to represent the provinces and the different ethnic groups in the eastern D.R. Congo. The witness himself contributed to the foundation of the movement by drafting its statutes. At that time, and as stated by Mr.Jomba, there were no military men among those founders.
As claimed by the witness, they founded the UPC primarily motivated by the desire for security. "The party was created to put a halt to the massacres in Ituri. There was a bad government of the Rassemblement Congolais (RCD), the region was managed by rebel groups. The citizens were abandoned to their fate, so we decided to organize ourselves. In essence, it was an opposition movement," says Mr. Jomba. The Ituri district, under control of the RCD of Wamba dia Wamba and Mbusa Nyamwisi, was in the grip of a war waged by rival ethnic groups (the Hema and the Lendu) that killed 50,000 people between 1999 and 2003.
The mutiny and the creation of the UPC armed branch
The Defence Counsel, Mr. Biju-Duval, moves on in time: April 2002. In that period, the witness was living in the Mutzipela neighborhood, in the town of Bunia, which still now remains a stronghold of Thomas Lubanga. Mr. Lubanga was also present in the city at that moment. "He was still the Commissioner for Defence of the RCD," explains the witness. According to his recount, the defendant was then engaged in a sort of alliance with the RCD to use Nyamwisi's influence over his allies, the rival ethnic groups (Lendu and Ngiti) to end the hostilities. "He looked for the well being and the development of the region. Iturians would be then able to recover economically but unfortunately the situation become even worse," says the witness.
"The RCD did not make any efforts to stop the killings," he states."It was inconceivable. They said they didn't have the means to put an end to the massacres, so the business men raised 15,000 USD to allow the RCD to combat the Lendu fighters. It was then when Thomas thought he had to resign (as Commissioner for Defence)."
After breaking with the RCD, Thomas Lubanga sought his own means to get the control of Bunia. In April 2002, a mutiny of the Hema commanders within the RCD represented an ideal opportunity. Amongst those who defected were Floribert Kisembo [the leader of the group and today General in the Congolese army], Bosco Ntaganda [Chief of Staff of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), an armed group now operating in the North Kivu province, sought by the ICC and still at large], Tchalegonza [today a General in the Congolese army] and Kisangaki.
On August 9, 2002, these mutineers supported the incursion led by the Ugandan army (UPDF) and expelled the RCD from Bunia. The UPC could do nothing else except gain political advantage from the military success of the Hema soldiers: "that was a victory not only of the soldiers but also of the UPC," says the witness. "The RCD's army was accomplice of the crimes that happened in Ituri, so the UPC expressed its joy and then claimed its place within the transitional government."
In September 2002, when the UPC assumed the control of Bunia, the political movement gave the mutineers both a military and political structure. Soon later, Thomas Lubanga was appointed President of the UPC and Commander in Chief of its military wing, the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (FPLC), while Floribert Kisembo and Bosco Ntaganda were designated Chief of Military Staff and Deputy respectively.
Defence: Thomas Lubanga did all he could to demobilize child soldiers
Mr. Jomba tells the judges that the recruitment of minors to fight in the Ituri conflict was common practice. "In the course of 2000 and 2002, civilian population procured its own security. To respond to the act of aggression perpetrated by the Lendus, the communities organized in self-defense committees. They were integrated by young people," he explains.
-"Were there children under the ages of 15?" asks Mr. Biju-Duval.
-"Yes, there were people from all ages," answers the witness.
This line of argument leads to the Defence to show the judges that Mr. Lubanga tried to change this apparent common tradition. "Thomas Lubanga, as the President of the UPC, took several decisions in order to demobilize minors in the FPLC. It was something discussed in different meetings," says the witness. "The first decision was taken in October 2002, when the main staff at the FPLC was ordered to monitor their troops to find minors amongst the ranks," he continues. "A second decision was issued in November 2002 through Radio Candip, later on we debated the issue once again in January 2003. It was necessary to reassess the situation."
The Defence announced it will call five witnesses to support its second phase (19, 11, 7, 36 and 37). Three of them (7, 36 and 37) will testify via video link.
